Omega-sequence Paradoxes (Part II)

1 The Bomber's Paradox¹ [Paradox Grade: 6]

There are infinitely many bombs:

Bomb	When bomb is set to go off			
B_0	12:00pm			
B_1	11:30am			
B_2	11:15am			
÷	:			
B_k	$\frac{1}{2^k}$ hours after 11:00am			
÷	:			

Should one of the bombs go off, it will instantaneously disable all other bombs. So a bomb goes off if and only if no bombs have gone off before it:

(0) B₀ goes off ↔ B_n fails to go off (n > 0).
(1) B₁ goes off ↔ B_n fails to go off (n > 1).
(2) B₂ goes off ↔ B_n fails to go off (n > 2).
⋮
(k) B_k goes off ↔ B_n fails to go off (n > k).
(k + 1) B_{k+1} goes off ↔ B_n fails to go off (n > k + 1).

Will any bombs go off?

¹This paradox is due to Josh Parsons, who was a fellow at Oxford until shortly before his untimely death in 2017. (It is a version of Bernadete's Paradox.)

2 Yablo's Paradox² [Paradox Grade: 8]

There are infinitely many sentences:

 $\begin{array}{ccc} \text{Label} & \text{Sentence} \\ S_0 & \text{``For each $i > 0$, sentence S_i is false''} \\ S_1 & \text{``For each $i > 1$, sentence S_i is false''} \\ S_2 & \text{``For each $i > 2$, sentence S_i is false''} \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ S_k & \text{``For each $i > k$, sentence S_i is false''} \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ \end{array}$

The meanings of our sentences guarantee that each of the following must be true:

(0) S₀ is true ↔ S_n is false (n > 0).
(1) S₁ is true ↔ S_n is false (n > 1).
(2) S₂ is true ↔ S_n is false (n > 2).
⋮
(k) S_k is true ↔ S_n is false (n > k).
(k + 1) S_{k+1} is true ↔ S_n is false (n > k + 1).
⋮

Which sentences are true and which ones are false?

3 Bacon's Problem³ [Paradox Grade: 7]

• An omega sequence of prisoners: P_1, P_2, P_3, \ldots (P_1 is at the end of the line, in front of her is P_2 , in front of him is P_3 , and so forth.)

²This paradox was discovered by Steve Yablo, who is a famous philosophy professor at MIT (and was a member of my dissertation committee, many years ago).

³This paradox is due to USC philosopher Andrew Bacon.

- Each person as assigned a red or blue hat, based on the outcome of a coin toss.
- Everyone can see the hats of people in front of her, but cannot see her own hat (or the hat of anyone behind her).
- At a set time, everyone has to guess the color of her own hat by crying out "Red!" or "Blue!".
- People who correctly call out the color of their own hats will be spared. Everyone else will be shot.

Problem: Find a strategy that P_1, P_2, P_3, \ldots could agree upon in advance and that would guarantee that at most finitely many people are shot.

4 The Three Prisoners⁴ [Paradox Grade: 2]

- Three prisoners. Each of them is assigned a red or blue hat, based on the outcome of a coin toss.
- Each of them can see the colors of the others' hats but has no idea about the color of his own hat.
- The prisoners are then taken into separate cells and asked about the color of their hat. They are free to offer an answer or remain silent.
 - If all three prisoners remain silent, all three will be killed.
 - If one of them answers incorrectly, all three will be killed.
 - If at least one prisoner offers an answer, and everyone who offers an answer answers correctly, then all three prisoners will be set free.

Problem: Find a strategy that the prisoners could agree upon ahead of time which would guarantee that their chance of survival is above 50%.

 $^{^{4}\}mathrm{I}$ don't know who invented it, but I learned about it thanks to philosopher and computer scientist Rohit Parikh, from the City University of New York.

Prisoner A	Prisoner B	Prisoner ${\cal C}$	Result of following Strategy
red	red	red	Everyone answers incorrectly
red	red	blue	${\cal C}$ answers correctly
red	blue	red	${\cal B}$ answers correctly
red	blue	blue	A answers correctly
blue	red	red	A answers correctly
blue	red	blue	${\cal B}$ answers correctly
blue	blue	red	${\cal C}$ answers correctly
blue	blue	blue	Everyone answers incorrectly

Figure 1: The eight possible hat distributions, along with the result of applying the suggested strategy.

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